Return To Top

Finding 3

Some demographics and groups of young people are more vulnerable to conspiracy belief than others.

Summary:

There are many stereotypes and preconceptions around the groups or types of young people who might be vulnerable to conspiracy beliefs, but these were not entirely borne out by our research.
Psychological factors are more closely linked to how students approach conspiracies and therefore better predictors than the demographics.
Marginalisation – the feeling that the world has been set up in ways that discriminate or marginalise the respondent – had the strongest link with receptiveness of all the variables we tested.
Other significant factors included beliefs that the lives of ordinary people are getting worse, that the world is becoming a scarier place, and concerns around free speech.
Some demographics were found to have higher rates of receptiveness to conspiracy theories, namely girls, those who have older siblings, and young people who receive free school meals, suggesting that receptiveness may be influenced by socioeconomic status.
Neither the pupil’s age nor ethnicity had a connection with how receptive they are to conspiracy theories.

There are many stereotypes and preconceptions surrounding the groups or types of young people who might be vulnerable to conspiracy beliefs, misinformation and disinformation. In particular, a recent focus around young men’s vulnerability has been highlighted in the media.1 These preconceptions were not entirely borne out by our research, which sought to unpick some of the demographic and psychological factors which may influence receptiveness to conspiracy beliefs, misinformation and disinformation.

As part of this research we used a linear regression model (technical detail available in Appendix 3), to enable us to take a long list of potentially predicting factors, based on the wider literature, and identify which of them have the strongest connection with how students approach conspiracy theories. To do this, we created a receptiveness measure (explained further at the end of this section).

We first analysed demographic factors and found there were particular demographics who were more receptive to conspiracy belief:

  • On average, girls have higher rates of receptiveness to conspiracy theories (p<0.01) than boys, a finding which flies in the face of some of the preconceptions surrounding conspiracy belief to date.
  • Young people who have older siblings also have a higher receptiveness to conspiracy belief (p<0.05), which we suggest may be a result of both exposure to content aimed at older children and the influence of older siblings who are often in a position of trust.
  • Young people who receive free school meals also appear to be more receptive (p<0.01), suggesting that receptiveness may be influenced by financial security. This aligns with the wider literature, which suggests that socioeconomic status is closely aligned with levels of education levels and this latter factor is a more reliable indicator of receptiveness to conspiracy theory population wide.

There were two demographic factors that did not show any link to conspiracy receptiveness: neither the pupil’s age nor ethnicity showed a correlation with how receptive they are to conspiracy theories. 

While our first analysis focused on demographic factors, the literature suggests that other aspects of our psychology are related to how people view conspiracy theories.2 This does not mean that demographic variables play no role in vulnerability, but that the psychological variables are better predictors. We examined this more closely by combining these demographic variables with the attitudinal and psychological factors to further analyse students’ receptiveness to conspiracies.

To do this, we overlaid the psychological factors with our existing demographic analysis. There were ten psychological factors; engagement, exclusion, agency, marginalisation, optimism, dangerous worldview, social comparison, free speech, declinism and discontinuity. Each of these factors are explained further at the end of this section.

We found that gender remained a significant factor, but that the other previously significant demographic variables (young people with older siblings and those on free school meals) were not significant when we account for the psychological factors. This does not mean that demographic variation in receptiveness no longer exist, but that psychological factors are more closely linked to how students approach conspiracies and are therefore better predictors than the demographics.

Of these psychological factors, marginalisation had the strongest link with receptiveness (p<0.0001). The feeling that the world has been set up in ways that discriminate or marginalise the respondent correlated highly with receptiveness to conspiracies.

Three additional psychological factors had more modest (yet still statistically significant) correlations with receptiveness to conspiracies. First, those with a stronger belief that the lives of ordinary people are getting worse was linked to being slightly more receptive to conspiracies (p<0.0001). Second, those with stronger belief that the world is becoming a scarier place were slightly more receptive to conspiracies, which we termed a ‘dangerous worldview’ (p<0.05). Third, those with strong beliefs in free speech are slightly more receptive to conspiracies (p<0.005)

These results suggest two approaches that should be considered for engaging with young people on conspiracy theories, misinformation and disinformation.

First, that there may be a need to engage differently on these topics with different demographic groups. Second, this analysis paints a picture of receptiveness to conspiracy theories as part of a broader perspective of societal and even personal ostracisation, difficulty, and decline. This mindset includes feeling like society, which is declining and dangerous, is set up to make it difficult for people like you. 

More interventions which identify young people who meet these criteria would allow for targeted approach to addressing vulnerability to conspiracy belief, misinformation and disinformation.

Methodology for Receptiveness Measure:

Our survey to pupils included a set of questions which present some of the basic, fundamental aspects of conspiracies, without mentioning specific and politicised examples. We wanted to measure to what extent students have this sort of conspiratorial architecture in their minds without tapping into their political ideology or any partisan affinities. With this in mind, we presented these items and asked the pupils how truthful they are:

  • Some political groups have secret plans that are not good for society
  • The real truth about significant events is often hidden from the public
  • Many political decisions are influenced by secretive groups or societies
  • Major past events have been faked in order to influence voters

We took the responses to these four items and averaged them to create a measure we have called “receptiveness”.

First, we wanted to see if there are any specific demographic characteristics which have stronger links to conspiracy receptiveness, and our results identified a few that have statistically significant correlations. One of the benefits of this statistical process is that we can assess these links while taking other factors into consideration, meaning that for example we can say that gender plays a role even accounting for the different types of schools the pupils attend.

We included a range of factors, which were captured in our survey by asking questions relevant to different aspects of a person’s mindset, specifically items that assess:

  • Engagement – levels of engagement with politics and current affairs
  • Exclusion – feelings of exclusion and loneliness
  • Agency – feelings of agency over decisions and future
  • Marginalisation – feelings of marginalisation and broader discrimination by society
  • Optimism – straightforward optimism about the future
  • Dangerous worldview – belief that the world is becoming an increasingly scary place
  • Social comparison – tendency to compare oneself to others, or to seek validation from comparison
  • Free speech – belief that all views should be possible to express
  • Declinism – belief that the lives of ordinary people are getting worse
  • Discontinuity – feeling that the past and present are disconnected because the world moves so fast it is hard to understand

A more detailed explanation can be found in Appendix 3.

For some pupils, staff told us about their concerns regarding young people’s ability to discern reality from fiction.

Appendix 3

Regression Results

Regression model 1 – Demographic Variables

Results of the regression conducted with demographic variables. Dependent variable was the Receptiveness Measure. Positive coefficients indicate increased “receptiveness”, negative coefficients indicate decreased “receptiveness”.

Regression model 2 – Demographic & Attitudinal Variables

Results of the regression conducted with demographic and attitudinal variables. Dependent variable was the Receptiveness Measure. Positive coefficients indicate increased “receptiveness”, negative coefficients indicate decreased “receptiveness”.

Attitudinal items we used were as follows:

  • Engagement – levels of engagement with politics and current affairs
  • Exclusion – feelings of exclusion and loneliness
  • Agency – feelings of agency over decisions and future
  • Marginalisation – feelings of marginalisation and broader discrimination by society
  • Optimism – straightforward optimism about the future
  • Dangerous worldview – Belief that the world is becoming an increasingly scary place
  • Social comparison – tendency to compare oneself to others, or to seek validation from comparison
  • Free Speech – belief that all views should be possible to express
  • Declinism – Belief that the lives of ordinary people are getting worse
  • Discontinuity – Feeling that the past and present are disconnected because the world moves so fast it is hard to understand.
  1. The Heterodoxy: are ’free thinkers like Joe Rogan driving young men to the right, or just confusing them?, Anna Merlan for the Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/14/young-men-election-joe-rogan-donald-trump
  2. See for Example: Bowes, Shauna M., Thomas H. Costello, and Arber Tasimi. "The conspiratorial mind: A meta-analytic review of motivational and personological correlates."Psychological Bulletin (2023).